Hi,
I agree that a machine might be able to resemble the functions of a mind, but
still never be able to accomplish the tasks a mind can perform. This might be a
silly confusion but just to be clear so, we are saying that the mind is
inconsistent right? Because it can prove an axiom and it's negation, and Godel
states that mind is self-referential. Now relating Godel's statement to
Penrose, does this mean that a formalist's notion of 'truth' in order to be
valid should be self-referential as well?? Also to me the words inconsistency
and self-referential feel like they are being used to prove the same formalist
view that minds are inconsistent while machines are not, and neither is
mathematics?
Divya Sharma
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