Hi,
I'm under the impression that the mind is consistent because we have to
assume it to be (see Lucas' article). Not only can we accept both halves of
a statement (its "truth" and its negation), but we are also selective, in
that we are able to choose not to consider nor express the negation part
because doing so would make us look like we've "lost our minds" (i.e. we
choose not to say contradictory things, especially when arguing, for obvious
reasons).
Lucas goes at length at talking about consistency and how humans being
consistent is another way that sets humans apart from machines.
Hope that helped!
- Jason
----- Original Message -----
From: <spree@yorku.ca>
To: <math3500@mathstat.yorku.ca>
Sent: Monday, December 06, 2004 6:07 PM
Subject: dizzard and truth
> Hi,
>
> I agree that a machine might be able to resemble the functions of a mind,
> but
> still never be able to accomplish the tasks a mind can perform. This might
> be a
> silly confusion but just to be clear so, we are saying that the mind is
> inconsistent right? Because it can prove an axiom and it's negation, and
> Godel
> states that mind is self-referential. Now relating Godel's statement to
> Penrose, does this mean that a formalist's notion of 'truth' in order to
> be
> valid should be self-referential as well?? Also to me the words
> inconsistency
> and self-referential feel like they are being used to prove the same
> formalist
> view that minds are inconsistent while machines are not, and neither is
> mathematics?
>
> Divya Sharma
>
>
> ___________________________________________________________________
> This message was sent to the math3500 discussion list by spree@yorku.ca .
>
___________________________________________________________________
This message was sent to the math3500 discussion list by "Jason Dong" <kinezo@yorku.ca> .
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